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33Q 
ERVI~ L. PETEHSOX, Apppllant, Y. LAMB R(TB13ER 
CO~IP AXY (a Corporation), Respondent. 
[la,lb] Sales-Warranties-Utility and l'itness.-Wherc n grind-
ing wlH'('1 sold by dd't'Il(hnt Illanuf::ctni't'r to plaintiff's em-
ployer was ll1:lIlui'ndnred, ~old [IntI pur~hns('d to be used on a 
power driven, high speed, rotating motor, and where it was 
known by defendant to be dnngerous if defeetively made or 
operated nt "peeds heyond its lllaxill1Ull1 enpacities (which 
were Ilut l:wrked on it) and tllnt its ingredients were secret 
and knowll only to defcllIlnnt, it was n dangcrous illstrnllH'n-
tality if containin:! l:ltl'nt dl'fects or if improperly used, :In!1 
ill Vil'W 01 modern indnstrinl usage employes should be eOll-
side['('d mcmhers of the industrial "family" of thl' employer, 
whl'ther corporate or private, and thus stand in such privity 
to the manufactm·pr to permit an employe, who was injured 
when the wheel "bIl'w up" or di~intcgrllted in his face, to 
be covcred by warranties made to the purchasrl'-employer. 
Such employe has the ~uC'('es~i ve right to po::session and use 
of the grinding wheel handed OYer to him hy his employer, 
and should fairly be consi.1l'red to be ill }ll'ivity to the v('ndor-
manufacturer with respect to the implied warranties of fitness 
for use and of merchantable quality on which recovery was 
sought. 
[2] Evidence-Judicial Notice-Matters of Commerce.-It is a 
matter of COlllmon knowledge, known to vendor-manufacturers, 
that Illost busin(,sH~s arc carried on by means of the assistance 
of employes and that equipment or supplies purchased by em-
ployers will iu actual use be handled by the employes, who in 
this respect may be said to stand in the shoes of thc employer. 
[3] Words and Phrases-"Privity."-The term "pl'ivity" appears 
to be of uncertnin origin and meaning and to have been de-
veloped by the courts nnd applied in Yllrious contl'xts. One 
of the customary definitions is that "pl'i"ity" deIlotes llIutulIl 
or successi\'e relationship to the same thing or right of prop-
I'rty; it implies sncces!:'ion. 
[4] Trial-Instructions-Construction as II Whole.-Instrnetion;; 
are to be cOIlsidered as a whole, and in the absence from the 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Salcs, § 117 et seq.; Am.Jur" Sales, § SU 
et seq. 
[4] Sl'e Cal.Jur.2d, T rial, ~ 16·!; Am.Jur., Trial, § 14:2. 
McK. Dig. References: [lJ SnIPs, ~lS3(3); [21 Evi.1encc, §84; 
[3] WOl'lls:lIld l'hl'a;;e~; (4] Trial, §lDG(l); [:'i] Xpgligcu(:p, §:2H. 
) 
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record of the other ill:;truclions :m nppel\ate court i,; i~ nil 
position to say that a pnl'ticular instrurtion was or was not 
pr('judicial. 
[5] Negligence-Appeal-Harnlless Error-Exclusion of Evidence. 
-In Iln action for personal injuries sustained by a corporation 
employe when an abrasive wheel 1lI:lIlufactured by defendant 
and purchased by the corporation "blew up" in the employe's 
face while he W:lS using it., the exclusion of evidence of n 
statement of opinion by the employer's superintendent con-
cerning whether the employe's glnsses were safety glasses was 
not prejudicial where the employe had previously been per-
mitted, over dcfcndant's objection, to testify that the glasses 
he was \\'caring nt the time of the accident were safety glasses 
"to the best of lI1y knowlcdge," and to give the reasons for that 
belief. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Arthur Crulll, Judge. Affirmed in part 
and reversed ill part with directions. 
Action for damages for personal lllJuries predicated on 
alleged negligence of defendant manufacturer and on alleged 
breach of implied warranty. Judgment for defendant af-
firmed with respect to count based on Ilegligeuee, reversed 
with respect to warranty COllllt, and cause remanded with 
directions. 
Robert C. Pannell, LeRoy L. Center and Asher R. Sailors 
for Appellant. 
lIoss, Lyon & Dunn, Sidney A. Moss and Henry F. Walker 
for Respondent. 
Bronson, Bronson & McKinnon as Amici Curiae on behalf 
of Respondent. 
SCHAUER, J.-In this action to recover for personal in-
juries suffered by plaintiff as the result of explosion of a 
grinding wheel purchased from defelldaut by plaintiff's em-
ployer, the trial court snstained without leave to amend a 
general demurrer to the count of the ('omplaiut based 011 
breach of implied warrallty. Trial was had on the other 
(first) count. based on negligcnce, and the jury found for 
defendant. Plailltiff appeals from the ensuing judgment for 
defendant. 'Ve have concludt'd that plaintiff's contentious of 
error in the trial 011 the uegligeu('c COllut are without IIwl'it 
June l!JGO) PETEH,.;O:-; I'. LAMB nt'BIlEH CO. 
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but that the j1ll1g"nll'llt should be rcwrsed with respect to the 
warranty count. 
In Deeember, 1!J54, defendant, a manufacturrr of rubber 
bonded abrasives, sold and deliwred to plaintiff's employer, 
AiResean,h Manufaduring' Company, a corporation, one hun-
dred rubber bondt'd abrasive wlll'els for use in !!.'rinding and 
burring operations. The wheels, two inches ill lliameter, eon-
tained no markiug"s ('ithel' to identify the manufacturer or to 
illdieate the maximum revolutions per minute at which the 
abrasive wheels could be safely operated. In Jnll<', 1955, while 
plaintiff ill connection wit h his elllplo~-l1lent ,,-as using a wheel 
which he alll'ges was one of those sold to his employer by 
defendant, the wheel" blew up" or disintegrated in his faee 
and a portion of the ahrasive imbedded itself in his left eye, 
resulting in admittedly serious injury, 
lVarrallty COllllt 
Plaintiff's first contention on appeal is that the court erred 
in sustaining the demurrer to the second eause of action, which 
alleged an implied warranty by defendant of fitness for use 
and of merchantable quality under the provisions of subdivi-
sions (1) and (2) of section 1735 of the Civil Code,l The 
parties agree in their briefs that the only ground upon which 
the demurrer could have been sustained is that of lack of 
privity of COil tract between plaintiff and defendant manu-
facturer_ 
Defendant, rel~-ill~ upon Burr v_ Sherwin Williams eo. 
(1954), 42 Ca1.2d 682, 6D5-697 [1!J-23) [268 P .2d 1041], and 
Lewis v, TelTY (1896), ]11 Cal. 39 [43 P. 398, 52 Am.St.Rep. 
146, 31 hRA_ 220], uri!es that the general rule is that im-
plied warranties, other than ill the sale of food or drugs, ex-
tend only to the immediate buyer, and points out that in the 
case of many sales, it is contemplated that someone other than 
the buyer will use thc goods, although that fact has not gen-
erally becn considered to constitute a ground for imposing on 
the seller an implied warranty liability to a user who is not a 
lCh-, Colle, ~ 173;" subu. (1): "Where tI,e buyer, expressly or by 
implication, makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which 
the goo(1g are rC'1nin'd, UI1<1 it appear" that the buyer relics on the sellcr's 
skill or ,judgment (,,,hether he he the grower or manufacturer or not), 
there is an implied Wa!Tllllty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for 
Bud, pnrpORC." 
Sabd. (~): "WII(:l'O the goods arc honght hy description from a seller 
who deals in goods of that dc~cri!>tion (whether he be the grower or 
manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall 
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purchaser. 1"01' cxample, it was heW in Lewis v. Terry (1896), 
SlIprll, that a tellant could lIot recover on implied warranty 
against a mllllufadul'l'r-seller for injuries sustaiul'd through 
use of a defl·ctive bed, purchased by his landlord. (Of, Dahms 
v. General Elevatvl' Co. (1932), 214 Cal. 733,738 [1] [7 P.2d 
] 013].) Plaintiff, on the other hand, eonil'lHls that there are 
110 California cascs c.lireetly in point involving a fact situation 
ill which a rubber bonded abrasive was" purchased and sold 
to be used on high speec.l, revolving, power-driven equipment, 
a highly dangerous instrumentality," and that the trend to-
day is toward disappearance of the requirement of privity of 
contract in cases where it is foreseeable that someone other 
than the immediate vendee will be injured by a defective 
product. The more recent California cases on the subject, and 
those cited or discovered from out of state jurisdictions which 
seem in point here, are as follows: 
1{[ein v. Duchess Sandw-ich 00., Ltd. (1939),14 Ca1.2d 272, 
276-283 [2, 3] [93 P.2d 799] : Plaintiff husband purchased 
from a retailer packaged sandwiches manufactured by de-
fendant Duchess Sandwich Company. Plaintiff wife swal-
lowed a bite from one, discovered worms in the remainder of 
the sandwich, and became ill. Defendant contended that no 
implied warranty existed as to plaintiffs, because of lack of 
privity. Tllis court, in reliance upon various out of state cases, 
as well as upon other authorities, concluded (p. 282 [2]) that 
"the remedies of an injured consumer of unwholesome food 
ought 110t to be made to depend 'upon the intricacies of the 
Jaw of sales,' and the warranty of the manufacturer to such 
consumer should 110t be made to rest solely on 'privity' of 
contract," and (p. 283 [3) that "the rulings made in the 
authorities herein cited [recognizing an exception to privity 
requirements in the case of foodstuffs] are based on sound 
principles,-affordillg as they do an adequate remedy for 
injuries which may result from the eating of unwholesome 
food by an ultimate consumer who, under modern economic 
conditions, almost of necessity, must purchase many items of 
food prepared in original paekages by the manufacturer and 
intended for the consuming public, although marketed 
through an intermediate dealer." 
Vaccarezza v. Sangllinctti (1945), 71 Cal.App.2d 687, 689 
[163 P.2d 4701: Plaintiffs hllSb,Ulll aud wife purchasctl salami 
froll1 a retailel', ",hiel! had hcen manufaetured by defeudants 
Panhwci, et al. '1'he wife and two chi1l1ren ate some of it and 
developed triehinosis. Plaintiffs sued bolh retailer and manu-
) 
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facturel', on an illlpli('d warrant,'" of fitlH':;),;. Till' <:Olll·t dcdal'c~ 
[1] the rule or absolllte liabiliiy l·t'~'ll·,l;(\"s Il~ lH'gligCllcC, ill 
implied warranty eaSt'S under scl'l!()n 1,33 o[ the Civil Codc, 
and [2J that privity i" not rC(luil'('(1 bL'tln'l'll l'Oll5Uliwr and 
manufacturcr whcre foodstuffs are invoIYt~d. 
Tre/llc/'oli v. A11stin Trailer Equip. Co. (1951), 102 Cal. 
App.~d 464, 417 [227 1'.2,1 023] : Plaintiff surd both retailer 
and manufacturer when a so-called fifth wheel (a deviee 
which connects and holds together a tractor and sl'mitrailer) 
whieh he had purchased from the retailer, broke and caused 
plaintiff property damage. Although defendant cites this 
ease ill support of the view that privity is required between 
eonsnmer and manufacturer to SllppOl·t recovery upon an im-
plied warranty, and although the case did proceed upon that 
view, the point does not appear to have been disputed or 
argued. 'l'hus, it is related ill the opinion (p. 467) that the 
ease was "submitted to the jury, 011 proper instructions which 
are not ehallenged," which withdrew il'om the jury the cause 
of action against the manufacturer based on warranty, be-
eause the evidence showed no privity, and submitted only that 
based on negligence. The statement on page 477 [9] of the 
opinion that the manufacturer's" liability, if any, is depend-
ent on negligence," apparently merely accepts the "unchal- i 
lenged" theory of the trial court. Since "Cases are not au-
thority for propositions 110t considered" (People v. Banks 
(1959), 53 Cal.2d 370, 389 [1 Cal.Rptr. 669, 348 P.2d 
102]), this case would not appear especially helpful to de-
fendant. 
Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co. (1954), supra, 42 Cal.2d 682, 
695-697 [19-23]: Plaintiffs authol'ized one Patton, field man 
for Cooperative, to arrange, as per Patton's recommendations, , 
to obtain an inseet spray and hire an aviation company to 
apply it to plaintiffs' cotton crop. Patton, with plaintiffs' 
approval, engaged defendant Rankin Aviation to do the 
spraying. Cooperative delivered t.o Rankin in sealed drums 
spray material, which defendant Shcrwin ,\Villiams had manu-
factured and delivered to Cooperative on consignment. Rau-
kin applied the spray, which damaged plaintiffs' erop. Plain-
tiffs sued SIH'rwin 'Yilliam:=;, CooperatiYC and nankin, charging 
all three with negligence and the first two with breach of 
warranty as well. The jury verdict was against Sherwin 
Williams, but in favor of the .other defendants. On appeal 
Sherwin ,\Villiallls urged, among other things, error in the 
instructions .oil illl plied warranties. 
) 
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The trial court had im;tmrted (pp. 692, 693) that if there 
was an implied warranty Illulcr subdivisions (1) and (2) of 
sedioll ]733 of the Civil Code,:! there was no requirement of 
privity of contract between the manufacturer and the ultimate 
consumer and the manufacturer would be liable, regardless of 
lll>gligeuce, for the damage caused hy any breach of this 
warranty. III discussing the privity point this court observed 
(p. 693 [12) that "the persons to whom the insecticide was 
delivcred wcre obviously their [plailltiffs'] agents for pur-
poses of the spraying operation." (Italics added.) And al-
though holding (p. 697 [24]), after discussing the exceptions 
with respect to (1) foodstuffs and (2) express warranties by 
means of labels or advertising material (pp. 695-697 [19-22]), 
that the trial court had erred in instructing that privity was 
not required to hold Sherwin Williams on statutory implied 
warranties, this court, in reversing the judgment, further de-
clared (p. 697 [23]) that "We need not consider at this time 
whether plaintiffs .•. can establish that there was privity 
between themselves and Sherwin Williams or that they come 
within some exception to the rule." (Italics added.) With 
respect to establishing privity, this comment seemingly refers 
to the earlier remark that the persons to whom the insecticide 
was delivered were obviously plaintiffs' agents. And since the 
exceptions to the privity rule had earlier been stated to be 
(1) the foodstuff exception which plainly was not involved in 
the case, and (2) the express warranty exception, the court's 
reference to "some exception," was ch>arly intended to guard 
against closing the door to the development of other exceptions 
as law and justice and changing economic conditions might 
require. As shown by the Duchess Sandwich case (Klein v. 
Duchess Sandwich Co., Ltd. (1939), supra, 14 Ca1.2d 272, 
276-283 [2, 31. the foodstuff exception was thus developed. 
Collum v. Pope If Talbot, Inc. (1955), 135 Ca1.App.2d 653 
[288 P.2d 75] : Plaintiff carpenters were injured when a ceil-
ing joist broke under their weight. They sued the dealer who 
had sold it to their general contractor employer, and also 
sued Pope & Talbot, the lumbcr mill opcrator which had pro-
cessed and sold the joist to the dealer. The trial court ordered 
a nonsuit on the counts predicated on an alleged warranty of 
fitness for use. On appeal it was hcld (p. 656) that the lack 
of privity was fatal to plain tiffs' claims, although in dis-
cussing (p. 657) plaintiffs' "claim that the trend of decision 
ill the last 25 years had been to extend the foodstuffs exception 
'See footnote I, B1lpra, p. 341. 
) 
.11111" 1 !)()O] PETERS/):" I'. LA ~m nnmFR CO. 3·1:) 
[54 C.2d 339: 5 Cal.Rptr. 863, 353 P.2d 5751 
to include any 'defectively manufactured product of industry 
whidl causes bodily injuries' ... ," the court pointed out 
(pp. 659-660 [1]) that this timber was not "manufactured," 
that any defects in it "'ere as readily apparent to plaintiff 
journeymen carpenters, as to mill inspectors, and, further, 
that plaintiffs had themsdves signifil'antly changcu this tim-
ber by cutting', fitting and nailing it in place to serve as a 
ceiling joist. Therefore, said the l'onrt, "we do not feel that 
we as an intermediate court of appeal should nndertake to 
enunciate and declare the sugge;;tcd extension" of the ex-
ception. 
In 77 Corpus Juris Secundum 1124, it is declared that 
"Although there is some authority to the contrary, it has 
been held that privity is not a prerequisite to recovery for 
breach of warranty where the subject of the sale which caused 
the injury was inherently dangcrous." In support, five cases 
are cited: (1) Mazetti v. A.rmour If; CO. (1913), 75 Wash. 
622 [135 P. 633, 48 L.RA. XS. 213, Ann. Cas. 1915C 140], 
which involved food: the court did, however, declare in its 
general discussion, but without citation of authorit~·, that to 
the general rule requiring privity "certain exceptions have 
been recognized: (1) Where the thing causing the injury is 
of a noxious or dangerous kind .... " (P. 634 [1] of 135 P.) 
(2) Fleenor v. Erickson (1950), 35 "\Yn.2d 891 [215 P.2d 
885], in which plaintiffs sought to recoycr damages suffered 
when their refrigerator locker plant in the basement of their 
store building froze the ground beneath, causing the building 
to buckle and necessitating the closing of the plant. After 
citing and quoting from the Mazetti case certain exceptions 
to the privity rule, including that ""~here the thing causing 
the injury is of a noxious or dangerous kind" (p. 889 [3] 
[215 P.2d ]), the court held that because of lack of privity 
plaintiffs could not recover on warranty from the manufac-
turer of the insulating material useu in installing the locker 
plant. 
(3) Williams v. S. H. Kress &; Company (195:'5),48 Wn.2d 
88 [291 P.2d 662], in which plaintiff consumer surd a manu-
facturer for damagc allegedly resulting' from thr use of anti-
septic as a mouthwash. After again eitillg and quoting (p. 
664 [1, 2] [291 P.2d]) the exceptions mentionrd in the 
Mazetti case, the court in this third case from "\Vashington 
held (p. 665 [3] [291 P,2d]) that breause the pUl'ehaser had 
not made known to the retailer that she wished a mouthwash, 
3-16 
anu the antiseptic was 1I0t so lah('11'(1, there was no illlpliell ' 
\rarranty of fitness. 
( 4) Worley v. Procl er d'; Gam ole Mfg. Co. (1952), 241 Mo. 
App. 1114 [253 S.\Y.:?d 532], in which the ultilllate consnmer 
of a detergent whith alll'gedly resulted in skin injuri('s had 
relied on advertising' labels, which, as already seen, is an 
exception to the privity rule. 
(5) Mahoney v. Shaker Square Beverages (1951, Ohio), 
102 N.E.2d 281, is a trial court decision. Plaintiff, a house-
hold employe, was illjured whell a bottlc of alc she was re-
moving from a carton, exploded. The court reviewed various 
theories of recovery and concludell, among other things, that 
(p.289 [5]), a bottle of ale containing pressure which causes 
it to explode upon ordinary handling is a dangerous instru-
mentality and not of mer~hantable quality, its sale is a 
breach of warranty and also negligence under Ohio law for 
\yhieh action lies in either warranty or negligence, and lia-
bility in either event extends to a member of the purchaser's 
household, including servants. 
Thus, none of these five cases provides clear support for the 
general proposition for which they were cited: that privity 
is not required where the item sold is inherently dangerous. 
Xor do other appellate conrt ('ases r('lied upon by plaintiff 
seem to do so: Um'ted States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. City of 
Waco (1937),130 Tex. 126 [108 S.W.2d 432]. and 1Ilannsz v . 
.llacU'hyte Co. (1946), 155 F.2d 445, 449, both involved ex-
press warranties direct to the commmer, and Coca-Cola 
Bottling Works v. Lyons (1927),145 Miss. 876 [111 So. 305], 
was a situation of glass in a bottle of beverage and so comes 
within the food cases. DiY ello v. Gardner Maclu'ne Co. (1951, 
Ohio), 102 N.E.2d 289, 293 [10], is another Ohio trial court 
opinion j it does, however, hola specifically that the sale of a 
"grinding wheel carried with it an implied warranty of 
merchantability and fit for the usagl's designed and that such 
warranty extended to the workmen of the vendee who Waf; 
injured in its ordinary use because of a latent defect ... " 
But as suggested by Professor Pross('r (Torts, 2d ed., p. 510, 
n. 49) the DiVello case was perhaps overruled hy Wood v. 
General Electric Co. (1953), 190 Ohio St. 273 [112 N.E.2d 
8, 11-12 [3, 4]], in which the Ohio supreme C011l't held that 
because of 1<1("k of privity the eOIlSUIlW!' ('ould not n'('over 
against the manul'adurer 011 all impli(,ll warranty of fitness 
where an all('gedly d('feetive ('led!'ie l)lanket I'l'sulted in 
plaintiff's residen('e catehillg fire. (C,f. however, Rog('rs v. 
J llne 1960] PETER3()X /', LA:llll ]~l)Il\lEl~ Co. 
[54 C.2d 339; 5 Cill.Rptr. 863, 3:;3 P.2d 5751 
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Toni IIolJle PC/'III(/II(I1/ Co. (]~j8), ]67 Ohio St. ~44 [147 
N.E.2u 612, 616 14-. ;; 11; J/rl."k()/'ic/t v. J[rJ(rssvlI (e: RobiJillS, 
Inc. (1968), lOG Ohio App. ~6;; [14!J N.E.2(1 181. lS,]; 
A1'!OIlS v. E. I. DlIl'ol!1 Dc .'iC)I!OIlJ'S (e- Co. (1!J,i8, C.C.A. ~), 
261 F.2u 434, 436; which suggest a possible (lispo,,;ition by 
Ohio to relax the privity rule, although any such relaxation 
may be intendl'u to appl~- only in cases of advertising by 
label, tradename, ete., as disC'llsscd in RIOT Y. S!Jrncin Wil-
liams (1945), supra, 42 Ca1.2d 682, 6a6 [19],) .And the other 
case cited by plaintiff, Laclede Steel Co. v. Silas .il1a.son Co. 
(1946), 67 F.Supp, 75], also a trial eonrt dccision, involved 
additional factors whil'h make it not pC'rsuasivc here. The 
same may be said of other cases citcd by both parties, some 
of which turn on the ('xC'C'ptiOllS relating to foodstuffs and to 
advertising or labels dirC'cted to the ultimate C'onsumer. 
[la] Plaintiff empha<;izl's. however, that the grinding 
wheel here involved was manufadul'C'd, sold, and pnrehase(l, 
to be used on a power driven, high speed, rotating motor; 
that it was known by defendant manufadurC'r to he dang'C'rous 
if defectively made or if operated at speeds beyond its maxi-
mum capabilities (which were not markC'n on it), and that its 
ingredients were secret and known only to defendant. There-
fore, says plaintiff, it was a dangerous instrumentality if con-
taining latent defects or if improperly llseil., and in view of 
modern industrial usage employes should be considered a 
member of the innustrial "family" of the employer-whether 
corporate or private-and to thus stand in such privity to 
the manufacturer as to permit the employes to be cOYerC'd hy 
warranties made to the purchaser-employer. 
We are pcrsuaded that this position is meritorious. [2] In 
the first place, it is a matter of common knowledge, and of 
course known to vendor-manufacturers, that most busines::;es 
are carried on by means of the assistance of employes an<1 
that equipment or supplies purchascd by employers will ill 
actual use be handled by the employes, who in this respect 
may be said to stand in the shoes of the employer. [3] More-
over the term "privity" itself appears to be of ullccrtain 
origin and meaning and to have heen developed by the courts 
and applied in various contexts. (See Klein v, Duchess Sawl-
wichCo., Ltd. (1939), supra, 14 Ca1.2d 272, 276-283 [2, 3] ; 
4 Corbin on Contracts, § 778; 33 'Words and PhrasC's 799-822.) 
One of the customary definitions is that "privity" denotes 
mutual or successive relationship to the same thing or right 
of property; it impliC's sllccession. (8C'e eases collC'etC'd in 
[:i-l C.2tl 
;1:3 \runts and Phrases 810·8:20.) [lb] Thlls, in the present 
t'olllt'xt, tl)(' employe had the SlIccl'ssiw right to the possession 
and nse of the grinding wheL'1 handed OWl' to him by his 
purchaser'l'lllp]oYl'r, and, wc bl'lievc, should fairly be con-
sidered to il(' in privity to the vendor·lllallufadurer with re-
spect to the implied warranties of fitness for use and of mer-
chantable quality upon whidl reeovcr~' is here sought. 
Amici curiae supporting defendant urge, however, that 
section 1735 of the Civil Code,3 enacted in 1931, has been 
consistently interpreted by the courts in a manner opposed 
to plaintiff's position and eontcntions, and that failure of the 
Legislature to alter the previous judicial interpretation is 
indicative of legislative intent. (See Colc v. Rush (1955) , 
45 Ca1.2d 345, 355 [8-9] [289 P .2d 450, 54 A.L.R.2d 1137).) 
However, as shown hereinaboY(" interpretation by California 
courts has not been as clear cut as amici curiae contend, and, 
further, thc foodstuffs exception has been court developed in 
the interim. (J(lcin v. Duchcss Sandu'ich Co., Ltd. (1939), 
su.pra, 14 Ca1.2d 272, 276-283 [2, 3J.) 
Negligence Count 
Plaintiff further Ul'ges that the trial court erred in giving 
a certain instruction proposed by defendant on the negligence 
count on w'hieh trial was had. This instruction followed 
plaintiff's instruction on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
Although plaintiff does not point out any erroneous statement 
of law contained in the instruction of which he complains, he 
asserts generally that it was confusing, wordy, misleading, too 
hroad, and incomprehensible to an inexpert group of jurors, 
gave undue prominence to the issue of overcoming the in-
ference of neglect described in the standard res ipsa loquitur 
instructions, and nullified the effect of such prior instructions. 
Inasmuch as the lengthy instruction involved is the only in-
struction included in the record, no useful purpose wonld be 
served by setting it forth. [4] It is elementary that in-
structions are to be considered as a whole (see Coggins v. 
Hanchctte (1959), 52 Ca1.2d 67, 75 [3] [338 P.2d 379] ; 48 
Cal.Jur.2d, 196-197, § 164), and in the absence from the 
record of the other instructions an appellate court is in no 
position to say that the particular instruction complained of 
was or was not pr<.>judicial. 
[5] Finally, plaintiff complains that the trial court erred 
in excluding evidence as to plaintiff's state of mind with 
'Ree footnote 1, .~"pra, p. 341. 
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reference to whether or not he reasollably bclicVt'u that he was 
wearing safety glasses at the time of the accident. Derenuant 
pleadeu contributory negligence of plaintiff as a uefellse to the 
negligence count, and the exclusion of evidence to which plain-
tiff rcfers occurred during the examination of the witness 
Swerdfiger, who was a supcrintenucnt for plaintiff's em-
ployer, as follows: 
"Q. By MR. CENTER [plaintiff's attorney] : Isn't it a fact 
that Mr. Peterson when he came to work in your division 
did come in to you with the glasses that he was wearing', that 
you and he did look at them to determine wh('ther you thought 
they were safety glasses 1 A. Not at the time of hire. Mr. 
Peterson was hired before I was superintendent of the com-
pany. 
"Q. Maybe it was at the time you becamc snperintendent 
... A. Sometime in that period of time prior to the acci-
dent, yes. 
"Q. Didn't you agree with Mr. Peterson that they looked 
like safety glasses to you?" 
The witness was not permitted to answer the last question, 
on objections that he was not qualified regarding glasses, no 
proper foundation had been laid, whether they looked like 
safety glasses to the witness or not would be immaterial to 
the issue of contributory negligence, and that his opinion 
would tend neither to prove nor to disproye such issue. 
Plaintiff had previously becn permitted, oyer defendant's 
objection, to testify that the glasses he was wearing at the 
time of the accident and which he had secured from the Navy 
were safety glasses "to the bcst of my knowledge," and to 
give the reasons for that belief. Since any testimony of Swerd-
tiger concerning a conYersation bet"'ecn plaintiff and himself 
regarding the appcarance of plaintiff's glasses would have 
been only cumulative evidence, its rejection under the circum-
stances does not appear to be prejudicial. 
Stlfficicncy of Evidence 
In conclusion it may be mentioned that defendant argucs 
that at the trial on the negligence count plaintiff failed to 
establish that the wheel whi(,h broke was one of those sold to 
his employer hy this defendant, and that therefore plaintiff 
is not in a position to urge a rewrsal on any of the threr 
contentions which he advanees 011 appral. Plaintiff, without 
supporting references to the record. asserts thcre was eVldencl!-
tracing the course of the whcel from the time of its purchase 
) 
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from defendant until it came to the burr bench at which 
plaintiff worked, and went to pieces when first used. However, 
since plaintiff's contention with respect to the demurrer to his 1 
cause of action based on implied warranty must be determined 
as a matter of law on the pleading without reference. to evi-
dence, and since his two contentions as to alleged error oc-
curring at the trial on the negligence count have been deter-
mined adversely to him on other grounds, we need not reach 
defendant's assertions as to insufficiency of the evidence to 
establish its connection with the allegedly defective wheel. 
The judgment is: (1) affirmed with respect to the first 
count, based on negligence; (2) reversed with respect to the 
second, or warranty, count; and (3) the cause is remanded to 
the superior court with directions to permit defendant (within 
such reasonable time as that court may fix) to file an answer 
or such other pleading or pleadings as defendant may elect. 
Gibson, C. J., McComb, J., Peters, J., Dooling, J., and Duni. 
way, J. pro tern.,· concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur in the judgment for the reasons 
set forth in my concurring opinions in EscoZa v. Ooca Oola . 
Bottling 00., 24 Cal.2d 453, 461-468 [150 P.2d 436] and 
Gordon v. Aztec Brewing 00., 33 Cal.2d 514, 523-533 [203 
P.2d 522]. 
[L. A. No. 25894. IIi Bank. June 23, 1960.] 
. CAROLE ANNTREGOFF PAPPA, Petitioner,v~ SU.-----~':'-~ 
PERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY et a1., 
Respondents. 
[1] Judges-Disqualiiication-Prejudice.-Under Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 170.6, subd. (3), providing that "only one motion [for per-
emptory challenge of a judge for prejudice] for each side may 
be made in anyone action," where one defendant disqualified 
one judge, the trial before a second judge resulted in a mis-
trial, and the case was then set for trial before a third judge 
whom a codefendant wished to challenge, the first defendant's 
motion to challenge such judge must be considered as baving 
[1] See Cal.Jur~2d, Judges, §§ 27, 41; Am.Jur., Judges, §§ 89, 
169 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-6,8-10] Judges, § 46; [7] Judges, § 60. 
* Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
